In military aviation, there is a certain silence that follows an embarrassing outcome, and the silence that has followed the Zilzal-II exercise has persisted for almost two years. At last, the figures appeared on Chinese state television, followed by Pakistani and Gulf media, each of which contributed a little bit. Nine meetings. The J-10CE scores nine, while the Eurofighter Typhoon scores zero. People continue to discuss it because it’s the type of score that doesn’t actually occur in contemporary simulated combat between fourth-generation peers.
Pakistan Air Force J-10CEs and Qatar Emiri Air Force Eurofighters engaged in a drill in January 2024 in Qatar. There were four encounters outside of visual range and five close-quarters dogfights. They were all swept by the Pakistanis. The score has not been formally confirmed by either air force, which is a form of confirmation in and of itself. Governments typically issue press releases within days of positive results.
The Eurofighter program seems to have been quietly taking in negative news for years, and Zilzal-II simply made it impossible to ignore the trend. The UK has put off making any more purchases. Germany ordered the F-35A in 2022 and hasn’t really looked back, despite years of industrial pressure to stick with the European platform. From South Korea to Belgium, the aircraft has lost every tender it has entered against the F-35 and the F-15. In the Middle East, where purchasing decisions were rarely solely based on the jet, its sales successes have been concentrated.
The case of Qatar is the most peculiar of all. In 2022, the nation received 24 Tranche 3A Eurofighters, the most sophisticated version of the platform, equipped with the Captor-E AESA radar, which the European partner states have yet to fully implement. According to reports, by late 2025, Doha was considering selling the entire fleet to Turkey, which has its own problems with acquiring fighters after being excluded from the F-35 program. For three years. That is the time interval between exit strategy and delivery. It’s difficult not to interpret that.
Meanwhile, defense marketing departments are dreaming of a year like this for the J-10CE. Only a few months after the Zilzal-II reportedly performed admirably against the Indian Air Force in May 2025—the first time the aircraft had been tested in an actual shooting environment—the numbers were made public. This is unusually loud advertising for a platform that hardly anyone uses outside of China and Pakistan. The only other foreign client is Azerbaijan, and that order was placed recently.
Here, caution is advised. Exercise outcomes are elusive. Before the jets ever leave the ramp, the outcome is shaped by rules of engagement, missile parameters, who is acting aggressively, what radar mode is permitted, and what countermeasures are activated. Taken at face value, a 9-0 sweep raises the possibility of a generational divide, which is probably exaggerated. Ground control, pilots, training cycles, and doctrine are just as important as the airframe.
However, it is more difficult to ignore the bigger picture. Beijing has been covertly developing an aerospace ecosystem for the past 20 years, which Western defense analysts have consistently referred to as unproven or derivative. The AESA radar, integrated networking, and PL-15 missile are no longer hot topics. Clients in parts of Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Gulf are observing. And the perception is in the room now, regardless of how accurate the 9-0 figure is. In this market, perception usually takes care of itself long before a contract is signed.